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We examine a simple extension to existing credit contacts for the poor (‘microfinance
contracts’), that would allow financial institutions to provide repayment insurance to
their clients. The proposed contract uses the repeated nature of loans to build credit
records that borrowers in good standing can use to insure themselves against default in
case of adverse income shocks. After documenting borrowers’ desire for insurance
using data from a microfinance programme in Guatemala, we derive sufficient
conditions for the proposed contract to reduce borrower vulnerability while improving
repayment rates. These conditions are quite similar to those that credit-card and
automobile-insurance companies seem to apply to deter moral hazard and adverse
selection among their subscribers. We close the paper with a discussion on why
institutions lending to the poor may face particular implementation problems because of
the history of past failures of credit programmess for the poor.
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One of the important distinguishing characteristics of poor is their exposure and vulnerability
to risk. The prevalence of agriculture and accompanying activities (such as seasonal work),
the under-supply and poor quality of transportation and communication infrastructures, and
the unreliability of the macroeconomic environment tend to create strong ﬂuctuations in in-
come. Furthermore, low-income households, due to their higher consumption requirement as
a proportion of their income and their limited capacity to buﬀer the eﬀects of shocks, ﬁnd
themselves less able to absorb risk without falling below binding subsistence-level consump-
tion constraints [Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 93]. Low-income households are thus very
vulnerable to risk: income shocks have a signiﬁcant impact on household consumption.
In order to reduce the eﬀect of shocks on their consumption patterns, households engage
in strategies to mitigate their exposure to risk and lower the impact of shocks. However, these
strategies often induce a reduction in future income growth opportunities. Risk-management
strategies reduce household exposure to risk by the choice of less variable activities, but at the
expense of more proﬁtable ones [Reardon et al, 94]. Risk-coping strategies remedy the lack in
income through (often disadvantageous) changes in asset position and resources [Alderman
and Paxson, 94; Dercon, 00].1 By reducing households’ productive capacity, these risk-
management and risk-coping strategies can impart severe and often long-term consequences
to even temporary downturns.
In complete information settings, optimal contracts would involve payments contingent
on the states of the world and private actions. In the non-anonymous settings of local
or “village” economies, informational asymmetries are small enough to see such (at least
partially contingent) contracts exist. This is the case for quasi-credit contracts, in which
the repayment conditions of the contract depend on the relative outcome of the contracting
parties (Lund and Fafchamps [97] report evidence for the Philippines, Grimard [97] for Côte
d’Ivoire, and Udry [90] for Nigeria). This is also the case for remittances [Jensen, 98; de
la Brière et al, 98; Lucas and Stark, 85] and informal insurance arrangements [Coate and
Ravallion, 93; Morduch, 99]. However, these risk-sharing arrangements are incomplete even
1Examples include pulling children out of schooling [Jacoby and Skouﬁas, 97], cancelling or postponing
investments [Morduch, 99], over-exploitation of local resources [Platteau, 00], diminishing nutritional intake
[Deaton, 88; Dercon and Krishnan, 00], and running down relationship-based insurance beneﬁts [Goldstein et
al., 01].
1when agents have good information, and households — particularly poor households — remain
subjected to substantial uninsured risk [Deaton, 92; Paxson, 93; Townsend, 94; Jalan and
Ravallion, 99].
Furthermore, when one moves to settings in which agents have substantial private infor-
mation, contracts with full contingencies become diﬃcult to implement. Arrangements must
thus rely on non-manipulable signals of performance, letting rise to long-term contracting and
ﬁnancial instruments in well developed markets; and to share-cropping [Ackerberg and Bot-
ticini, 98], interlinked contracts [Besley, 1995], and other such arrangements in less developed
countries.
In a classic paper, Townsend [82] makes the case for the feasibility of risk-sharing contracts
even under private information. These contracts involve several periods with payments based
on past reports to induce truthful revelation of private information. While these schemes
may require complicated payments in a real-world situations,2 they still suggest that optimal
lending contracts under private information probably involve some mixture of credit and
insurance.
In this paper, we argue that the repeated nature of microcredit contracts can allow the
lending institution to set up insurance contracts through the creation of a reputation mech-
anism. Indeed, the success of microcredit institutions at successfully extending credit to the
poor, while maintaining high repayment rates, is widely attributed to the particularities of the
contracts oﬀered [Morduch, 99]: the loans are uncollateralized (thus favoring outreach);3 and
incentives to repay are created by granting borrowers access to larger future loans only upon
successful fulﬁllment of current contracts [Stiglitz, 90; Ghatak and Guinnane, 99; Sadoulet,
99a].4 The idea in this paper is to use the repeated interaction between the banks and clients
to allow borrowers to build a credit record, which they can use to insure themselves in case
of temporary liquidity shocks. We derive the conditions for the evolution of reputation, of
premia, and of the sanctions in case of claims, to protect the ﬁnancial institutions against
2Townsend’s [82] payment scheme has to induce truthful reporting of two possible states of the world.
Allowing for more states would induce an exponential increase in the number of incentive-compatibility con-
ditions.
3There has been a debate as what types of poor microcredit actually reaches. In particular, there is
increasing evidence that it does not directly help the poorest of the poor [Alexander, 01; Navajas et al., 01].
4To reinforce these dynamic repayment incentives, loans tend to be small short-term loans with frequent
payments (to minimize the beneﬁts of deviation from repayment) and display a sharp growth upon repayment
(to increase the beneﬁts from repayment of the current loan) [Varian, 90; Jain and Mansuri, 01].
2adverse selection, moral hazard behavior and fraudulent claims. These conditions are very
reminiscent of the types of conditions put on credit-card contracts in the United States, or car
insurance contracts. The caveat is that the co n t r a c tw ep r o p o s ei sn o ta no p t i m a lc o n t r a c t ,
s i n c ew ed e r i v es u ﬃcient conditions for the insurance contract to satisfy the participation and
incentive constraints for borrowers and the ﬁnancial institution. However, it is a simple and
implementable contract that improves the ones currently oﬀered.5
Very recently, the microﬁnance industry has developed an interest in providing insur-
ance products to their clients. The beneﬁt is two-fold: reduce borrower vulnerability, and
improve the ﬁnancial sustainability of institutions through a positive impact on repayment
rates [Del Conte, 00]. While clients are clearly demanding insurance products, the challenge
is to understand what types of products are best ﬁtted to their needs. Recently, Brown and
Churchill [00] have detailed insurance contracts in 32 institutions (out of the 60 institutions
that have been identiﬁed world-wide as oﬀering some type of microinsurance product). Their
focus has been on the advantages and disadvantages of microcredit institutions at provid-
ing insurance products. The advantages such institutions carry are their experience at the
grassroot level, having a client base they know, and their clients know and trust them. Their
disadvantages lie in the capacity of the institution to provide insurance, because of the tech-
nicality of insurance products (actuarial analysis), and because of the insurability of highly
covariate shocks. The solution proposed are alliances with specialized insurance companies,
in which the insurer devises the products and the microcredit institution distributes them
(referred to as “Partner-Agent model” in Brown and Churchill). However, most of these
initiatives have been cantoned to life, property, health, disability, and catastrophe insurance
— insurance for large and veriﬁable shocks [McCord, 01].6 The range of insurance product
oﬀered remains relatively limited.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe
microcredit contracts and illustrate the empirical importance of insurance for borrowers using
survey data from Guatemala. Section 3 presents a basic model which aims to capture the
salient features of the observed microcredit contracts, namely individual loans and group
5The reason we do not derive the less restrictive necessary condition is due to a lack of closed for solu-
tions. Necessary conditions for particular examples, however, would be relatively simple to simulate from the
expressions we provide.
6Even in case programs that provide loan-payment insurance, the insurance payment is made only upon
veriﬁcation of an identiﬁable shock (e.g. Canadian Cooperative Association (CCA) in China [Del Conte,
2000]).
3loans in which members are jointly-liable. This model is used to demonstrate the incentive
mechanisms behind microﬁnance contracts, and how insurance is an important by-product of
joint-liability loans. Section 4 extends the contracts to include insurance provision. The main
contribution of the paper is to show the contractual conditions that allow these contracts to
be sustainable for the institution and for theb o r r o w e r s . W ec l o s et h ep a p e rb yd i s c u s s i n g
the historical and regulatory limitations on the implementation of these contracts, and point
towards the importance of establishing transparent accounting practices.
2 Microcredit and Insurance
Microcredit contracts were introduced in the late 1970s by Muhammad Yunus, founder of
the now-famous Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. The idea was to provide working capital for
poor entrepreneurs to generate higher incomes and thus break the cycle of poverty that they
faced. While many programs have emerged over the past 30 years7 and have adapted the
original Grameen methodology, all rely on the same two basic principles: (1) poor borrowers
need credit and are credit-constrained; (2) institutions can thus use conditional access to
future loans as an incentive mechanism for repayment. As described in the introduction,
borrowers are oﬀered a sequence of (generally) uncollateralized loans, which grow overtime.
Loan repayment grants a borrower access to a further loan; any default, however, is punished
by a loss of access to these further loans.
Loan contracts have been oﬀered in two general forms: individual loans, in which bor-
rowers are individually responsible for their loans; and group loans, in which borrowers are
asked to form groups (typically between 3 and 8 people8), each member receives a loan, and
members are jointly liable for the entirety of the group loan: if any part of a group loan is
not repaid, all members of the group are considered in default.
There has been a long debate in the literature on the relative beneﬁts of individual versus
group loans. Authors have argued that the joint liability in group loans can have positive
eﬀect on repayment rates by inducing borrowers to coordinate on safer projects [Stiglitz,
90; Wydick, 95], pressuring each other to repay [Armendáriz, 99], or providing a mechanism
for institutions to charge diﬀerent eﬀective interest rates for diﬀerent types of borrowers,
7The Microcredit Summit Campaign Report [2000] reports 1,065 programs serving13.8 million clients in
the world.
8Although some “village banking” models use larger groups.
4thus diminishing the adverse selection inherent in contracts with asymmetric information
[Ghatak, 99]. Others have pointed out that joint liability can actually lead to lower repayment
rates both due to voluntary defaults and the (positive) covariance between incomes of group
members [Besley and Coate, 95]. Furthermore, despite possible improvements in repayment
rates, joint liability may lead to ineﬃciencies. Group members may over-monitor [Varian,
90] or put pressure on partners to take excessively safe and low return projects [Banerjee,
Besley, and Guinnane, 94]. Nonetheless, implicitly or explicitly, all these papers recognize
the importance of the repeated loans in creating dynamic incentives for borrowers to repay.
Unlike most of the academic work, practitioners have long focused on the “mutual help”
aspect of group lending. Jointly-liable borrowers will scrutinize each others’ projects and
actions, but will also come together and repay loans in case of trouble. As reported on the
Grameen Trust’s website: “The Group Model’s basic philosophy lies in the fact that short-
comings and weaknesses at the individual level are overcome by the collective responsibility
and security aﬀorded by the formation of a group of such individuals.” In this paper, we
concentrate on the insurance aspect of this mutual help in credit groups.
To illustrate the importance of this insurance provision, we turn to evidence from a 1995
survey that we conducted in Guatemala. We interviewed the 782 members of 210 credit groups
that were clients of Génesis Empresarial, a Guatemalan Non-Governmental Organization
(Table 1 provides descriptive statistics). They were small informal market sellers, very typical
vendors found in markets in low and middle-income countries, characterized by low sales
($400-$500 in good weeks) which were quite variable (sales in a bad weeks were around
40% lower on average). They kept low stocks of merchandise and had a high rate of capital
turnover as demonstrated by nearly half the sample buying merchandise more frequently than
2-3 times a week. Their activity was conﬁned to one business, although a large proportion
of households had other sources of income (only 40% of the surveyed entrepreneurs were the
sole source of household income).
Their access to credit was limited, with only 4% having access to formal banks. Their
main credit sources were money lenders and wholesale credit, although these tended to charge
very high interest rates (15-25% over the loan). Family and friends were also possible sources
of credit, but for small and short-term amounts.
Loans oﬀered by Génesis Empresarial were two-month loans for working capital, with
5regular payment schedules (weekly, fortnightly, or monthly). Loans started oﬀ relatively
small ($60) but grew rapidly upon successful repayment, typically by 10 to 30 percent. On
average, loans represented around two weeks worth of inventory. Repayment problems were
met with penalties: one late payment resulted in no increase in loan size; two late payments
reduced the loan size; and three late payments in a year resulted in permanent exclusion
from any further loan. Since payments start after the ﬁrst week of the loan, a fair share of
borrowers (19%) put part of the loan aside in order to make the ﬁrst one or two payments,
to reduce the chance of going into default.
While all borrowers surveyed were in groups — which Génesis requires to be between three
and eight members — all borrowers (in principle) have access to both groups and individual
loans. Both type of loans carried the same monthly interest rate (2.5%, as in the formal
banking sector in 19959) and had exactly the same growth paths and other terms. Yet, two
thirds of borrowers chose group loans.10
A question thus naturally arises: why would borrowers ever choose group loans? The
individual and group contracts are similar in every aspect except for the extra joint liability.
Part of the answer, we want to suggest, stems from insurance that emerges in these credit
groups.
The insurance-need measure we use records the number of times a borrower in a group
declares having had diﬃculties making a payment in the previous year. As reported in Table
2, over 60% of groups report a need for insurance over the past year. Typically, shortfalls in
income arise because of low sales or bad planning (74%), or of shocks such as robbery and
family illness (23%) — shocks that can be classiﬁed as idiosyncratic (although not necessarily
exogenous).11 In 69% of the cases, help came from someone within the group. For 23% of
cases, the help came from personal resources: either friends or family outside the group, or
from personal savings or borrowing from a money lender. The help is for non-trivial amounts
9This amounts to a real monthy interest rate of 1.65 percent [International Finance Statistics, 1998].
10While there is some diﬀerential screening in practice, borrowers can opt for an individual loan easily after
just a few rounds of group lending. People in older groups who remain in group loans therefore reveal their
preference for those groups over individual loans (switching costs are negligeable).
11While it is probable that the risk of robbery and family illness varies little from group member to group
member, repayment ability being aﬀected by low sales or bad planning is typically the result of borrowers’
choices of liquidity strategy. Borrowers who save earlier for the purpose of making the payment encounter fewer
problems in case of bad sales the last days before the payment is due. However, this is at a high opportunity
cost considering the high turnover of capital (payments represent 2-3 days of merchandise purchases, with half
of the borrowers buying merchandise at least 2-3 times a week — see Table 1). The trade-oﬀ for borrowers is
thus between risk and return.
6since it covers around 20% of the payment due by the person who cannot repay.12
The evidence from the Guatemalan data suggests that the need for insurance is important
and relatively frequent in credit groups. The next section examines how groups contracts are
instrumental in the provision of insurance between borrowers. In section 4, we will propose
a new contract that improves on the insurance sustained by joint-liability contracts.
3 Joint liability and insurance
In order to understand why some borrowers choose group loans over individual loans, we
present a simple model (inspired from Sadoulet, 99a) which aims at capturing the most
important features of microﬁnance contracts: the repeated loans, the informational advantage
that borrowers have over the lending institution, and the sanctions in case of default. While
the economic and social environments are somewhat stylized, the simplifying assumptions
allow us to clearly identify the precise role joint liability plays in the establishment and
sustaining of insurance arrangements.13 With these results, we will then be able to analyze
how to improve the current microﬁnance contracts by incorporating an explicit institutional
insurance aspect to them in Section 4.
Assume a continuum of individuals, each born with a sequence of one-period projects
requiring a unit of capital in every period. Each project in every period has two states of
nature: it can succeed and yield a positive return X, or fail and yield a return of zero.
Individuals are distinguished by their exogenous probability of success: in every period,
i’s project succeeds with an exogenous probability Pi. There is no moral hazard in eﬀort
or choice of projects (there will be moral hazard in the choice of repayment). Individuals
have no assets or other sources of income, and cannot save between periods.14 Projects must
therefore be ﬁn a n c e db yal o a ni ne v e r yp e r i o d .
Loans are provided by a unique ﬁnancial institution. The objective of the lending insti-
tution is to maximize the number of repaid loans, subject to a break-even constraint. It,
however, has no information on borrower type or on project returns. It can therefore not
12We refer to this “mutual help” as insurance because we have strong annecdotal evidence that suggest that
members of groups pay each other risk premia to compensate for diﬀerential risks in the credit groups.
13For a complete analysis of repayment strategies and of equilibrium behavior in this model, the interested
reader is referred to Sadoulet [99a].
14Alternatively, we could have assumed that the sequence of loans grow faster than the returns on individual
projects. It limits individuals’ incentive to default on the current loan and self-ﬁn a n c ef r o mt h e no nw i t ht h e
amount they did not repay.
7price-discriminate across borrowers or provide state-contingent contracts.
The ﬁnancial institution oﬀers two type of loans: individual loans, and group loans. Both
types of loans have the same modalities — same interest rate, same term (1 period), and same
amount — and operate on the same following principle: if a borrower fulﬁlls the repayment
requirements towards the ﬁnancial institution, she is granted a future loan. However, any
default is punished by the exclusion of the borrower from access to either types of loan from
then on.15 The only diﬀerence between individual loans and group loans is a joint-liability
requirement. In group loans, borrowers are asked to form a group; each partner receives
a loan; and the members are jointly liable: if any part of the group loan is not repaid, all
members of the group is considered in default.16 Once borrowers lose access to loans from the
ﬁnancial institution, they have no other source of credit and their future present discounted
value is (normalized to) zero.17
Repayment strategies are governed by borrowers’ ability and willingness to repay. When
a borrower’s project fails, she is unable repay her loan; she thus has no choice but to default.
When her project succeeds, however, she is faced with a choice of actions: she is able to repay,
but is she willing? In individual loans, willingness to repay has straight-forward consequences:
if she chooses to repay, she gets access to future loans; if she chooses not to repay, she’ll be
considered in default. In the group loan, her (simpliﬁed) repayment strategies are similar:
she can choose never to repay her share, irrespective of what her partners do; repay her share
only if her partners repay their share; or repay not only her share but also her partners’ share
if necessary. We will refer to this third strategy as “insurance.”18
To illustrate why people might choose group loans, we assume that borrowers have perfect
15It is clear that this permanent exclusion does not look optimal. However, this is the rule announced clearly
by all microﬁn a n c ep r o j e c t sw ea r ea w a r eo f ,a n di ti sp r e c i s e l yam o d i ﬁcation of this rule that the contract in
section IV will call for.
16The equality of interest rates on group loans and individual loans is a characteristic that we adopt to repli-
cate what is done in practice. It is clear that since individual loans and group loans are diﬀerent products,
they should carry a diﬀerent “price.” In personal communication, the ﬁnancial manager of Accion Interna-
tional, an organization which provides a microlending methodology to institutions, evoked simplicity and fear
of selection eﬀects if each contrat was priced diﬀerently.
17Alternatively, borrowers’ fallback option could be to turn to a money lender. Money lenders typically
have information on borrower types and on projects, and are a monopoly source of credit. Moreover, they
have recourse to severe punishments to control moral hazard. Evidence from the literature on informal money
lenders is that they can extract much of borrower surplus. We could therefore normalize the present discounted
value to borrowers of borrowing from this fallback option to zero.
18The repayment strategies in the group loan are in fact slightly more general than the ones we present in
that individuals do not simply repay necessarily their own share but a proportion of the total group loan (see
Sadoulet, 99a).
8information on types and actions of all potential partners, that they have no external sanc-
tioning mechanism, and that borrowers carry a non-veriﬁable reputation (observable only by
other borrowers, but not by the ﬁnancial institution). These assumptions are extreme but
provide stark results as to the beneﬁts of group loans. A weakening of these assumptions
simply diminish the beneﬁts of group loans as compared to individual loans.19
A few more unimportant technical assumptions are made for simplicity. Borrowers are
risk neutral. We restrict our attention to groups of 2 to avoid the trade-oﬀ between group
size and quality of partners. We assume that X ≥ 2L so that borrowers are always able to
provide insurance when their project is successful. This assumption, while seemingly strong
if taken literally (requiring 200% return on projects), is eﬀectively not very restrictive since
it is a direct consequence of our assumption that projects yield zero when they fail. In prac-
tice, projects rarely fail completely; the assumption is essentially that group members, when
successful, are always able to cover the amount by which their partners fall short. When they
cannot, it is as if their project had failed. A third assumption is that borrowers can only
participate in one loan in each period, to avoid a possibility of self-insurance through invest-
ment in several projects. The probabilities of success are assumed to be independent over
time and across borrowers to circumvent the potential trade-oﬀ between partner quality and
covariance of returns. Borrowers are assumed to be inﬁnitely lived (or to face an exogenous
probability of dying). They share the same discount factor δ ∈ (0,1). The borrower types
are distributed according to some (discrete or continuous) distribution F and there is a unit
mass of borrowers of every type (so that the equilibrium displays equal treatment within each
type).20 Since projects are identically and independently distributed over time, we restrict
strategies to be stationary over time.
Under these assumptions, Sadoulet [99a] shows that all borrowers who are “safe enough”
have an incentive to maintain access to future loans, where “safe enough” borrowers are
19Imperfect information between borrowers entail that intragroup contracts provide less than full insurance,
thus diminishing the relative beneﬁts of group lending as compared to individual loans. Similarly, outside
sanctions could allow individuals to set up insurance arrangements without joint-liability, thus diminishing
the role for joint-liability loans. If borrowers could become anonymous again after the group dissolve, in the
sense that past actions are not remembered, groups would provide less than full insurance, as in the imperfect
information case above.
20Formally, each borrower is denoted by a pair {i,n} ∈ [0,1] × [0,1] where the ﬁrst coordinate represents






For individual loans, this condition is straight forward: given that the project succeeds and
the borrower can repay, as long as the discounted expected value of getting another loan next
period and defaulting on it (δPiX) is greater than the cost of repaying the current loan (L),
then the borrower will repay his current loan:




A strategy of repaying loans when successful leads to the same condition. Repaying the
current loan and maintaining access to future loans as long as projects are successful outweighs
the one period beneﬁt of not repaying a loan (and losing access to future loans) as long as Pi
is safe enough:








Similarly, for group loans, borrowers will repay their loans and provide insurance if they
are safe enough that the beneﬁt of maintaining access to future loans is worth the cost of
repaying. More importantly, group loans provide a forum through which borrowers can set
up an insurance agreement in an environment in which they have no other existing insur-
ance opportunity (because of lack of external sanctioning mechanisms to enforce insurance
agreements). The new technology allowing the enforcement of insurance agreements is pre-
cisely the joint liability: it prevents borrowers from reneging ex post on insurance promises,
since the borrower not fulﬁlling the insurance agreement would be considered in default too.
In essence, the ﬁnancial institution, despite being uninformed, provides a punishment for
borrowers who do not conform with the insurance arrangement.
This new insurance opportunity through group loans oﬀers a valuable service to borrowers
who want to maintain access to future loans. This insurance is so valuable, in fact, that
borrowers may voluntarily form in groups whic ha r eh e t e r o g e n e o u si nr i s ki ne q u i l i b r i u m
[Sadoulet, 99b]: safe members join groups with riskier partners and “sell” them insurance.
Both safe and riskier types are better oﬀ than in separate homogeneous group since the riskier
member increases his inherent ability to repay the loan, while the safer member extracts more
surplus from the trade than she loses from having a riskier partner .
10Sadoulet [99a] shows that the condition for borrowers to repay their loans and insure
their partners when necessary is exactly the same as the condition for individual loans (1). No
borrower riskier than L
δX would ever be accepted as a partner in a group loan. Furthermore,
borrowers satisfying (1) either repay their loans and insure if the risk diﬀerential is not too
high in their group, or opt for individual loans (which they repay) rather than group loans if
they cannot ﬁnd an acceptable partner.
Tables 3 and 4 look at the risk composition of groups and insurance ﬂows within these
groups.21 As we see in Table 3, not all groups are homogeneous in risk. In fact, groups
homogeneous in risk are relatively scarce (18 groups out of 210). Furthermore, there exist a
signiﬁcant amount of extremely heterogeneous groups, with members in the two extreme risk
quantiles (33 groups) or separated by 3 risk quantiles (43 groups). While matching frictions
may prevent borrowers from ﬁnding their optimal partner, it would be diﬃcult to argue that
such pronounced heterogeneity would emerge from a homogeneous matching equilibrium,
particularly considering how under-served the credit market was in Guatemala.22
Moreover (Table 4), within groups, insurance ﬂows from the safer part of the risk distrib-
ution to the risky part (not only from the safer borrowers to the riskier partners in a group).
Groups are very heterogeneous in risk, and insurance is provided within these heterogeneous
group. Unfortunately, the data does not contain information on the payments from the riskier
members to their safer partners. Anecdotal evidence, nonetheless, does conﬁrm the existence
of such payments.23
The evidence from the Guatemalan data suggests that insurance is important and rela-
21Borrowers’ risk is measured by their liquidity strategy. The interested reader is referred to Sadoulet and
Carpenter [00] for details.
22Choice of heterogeneity to beneﬁt from negative covariance does not seem to be an issue in this data.
Covariance in sales did not appear to be an important feature in these urban markets, despite our prior
intuition that they would be. The major shocks — rain and seasonal variation in buying patterns — tended to
be perfectly covariate across activities and thus uninsurable within the group; and the patterns of sales do not
diﬀer greatly according to the products sold (except in case of durable goods).
23In Sadoulet [99a], we report the case of a group composed of four borrowers. The leader of the group was a
50 year-old man with a well-established cloth business, stocked with several rolls of cloth (over $2,500 worth).
He had been selling in this market for 26 years and was a well-respected ﬁgure in that section of the market.
The other 3 members of the group were shoe sellers, around 25 years old, all in their second year of business.
Each of them had no more than 30 pairs of shoes on hand, making them very vulnerable to the ﬂuctuations of
the market. It rapidly became clear, in talking to each member of the group, that the younger members of the
group were repaying part (if not all) of the group leader’s loan at every payment. He essentially repaid only
when the younger members needed assistance to repay the group loan. The younger borrowers were therefore
ready to pay more than 35% extra in interest in exchange for insurance (they were free to disband the group
and form a group between the three of them).
11tively frequent, and that borrowers form groups to maximize gains from trading insurance.
Yet, a ﬁnancial institution is much better able than these small credit groups of absorbing
credit risk. Transferring the credit risk from a lending institution to the (certainly more risk
averse) borrowers has eﬃciency and welfare costs.
Furthermore, contracts oﬀered by the lending institution do not take into account borrow-
ers’ repayment history. For example, a particular group that had been working with Génesis
for seven years and suddenly faced repayment diﬃculties for the ﬁrst time was evicted from
the program. While the loan oﬃcer would have liked to keep the group for future loans, she
recognized that making an exception would weaken the credibility of rules and could start an
avalanche of defaults. Yet, Génesis clearly had more information on them than on ﬁrst-time
borrowers. Not using this information in the loan contract suggests an important loss in
eﬃciency. In the next section, we propose a remedy by adding insurance clauses to credit
contracts.
4 Insurance provisions in credit contracts
The environment is as described in section 3: individuals need one unit of capital to invest;
projects yield an amount X when successful and 0 when they fail; borrowers are only able
to repay their loan when their projects succeed. The projects outcome are independent and
identically distributed over time for each borrower.
The ﬁnancial institution introduces an insurance contract tied to the individual loan.
The basic idea of the contract is that, since the institution has no information on the actual
outcome of projects in any particular period, insurance will be awarded conditional on a
measure of borrowers’ reputation. Through their repayment behavior, individual borrowers
build up a credit record and, as long as borrowers are in good standing with the ﬁnancial
institution, their insurance claims will be honored, thus protecting them from default.
T h et i m i n gi sa sd e p i c t e di nF i g u r e1 .I ne a c hp e r i o d ,b o r r o w e r si ng o o ds t a n d i n gr e c e i v ea
loan. If they qualify for insurance, they choose whether to subscribe to the insurance contract
or not, and pay the according premium out of the loan they just received. They invest the
remainder of the money and their project succeeds or not. They then take the repayment
decision. The stage game then ends and the game moves to period t +1 .















Figure 1: Timing of Loan and Insurance contract
initially has no information on any particular borrower, all borrowers start at the same
reputation, say the mean of the institution’s prior on distribution the distribution of types:24
µ
[1]
i = E[1] (Pi)=µ[1]
where E[t] denotes the expectation taken by the ﬁnancial institution at the beginning of
period t (i.e. before observing i’s repayment outcome in time t).25 As time passes, the
institution updates individual borrowers’ reputation according to observations of repayment













i represents the number of claims i has made up to the beginning of loan t.26 An
example is depicted in Figure 2. Repayment of a loan increases i’s reputation; a claim
decreases her reputation.
In order to ﬁnance the insurance, the ﬁnancial institution ﬁxes an insurance premium. The
24Recall, borrowers have no assets or other sources of income. They are thus unable to signal their type by
any type of investment or bond posting.
25The square brackets are used to distinguish the notion of “at the beginning of time t” from exponential
powers.
26Note that, since the returns for individuals are independent and identically distributed over time, the order





Figure 2: Evolution of borrower reputation
premium is charged at the time the loan is disbursed. We constrain the ﬁnancial institution to
charge actuarially fair premia to each subscriber (up to incentive constraints that will emerge
below). The premium ψ
[t]
i for borrower i in time t depends therefore on her reputation µ
[t]
i










From period to period, the premium is updated according to (3) as more information becomes
available.
The ﬁnancial institution has to protect itself from two sources of abuse. The ﬁrst one
stems from the borrowers who never repay any loan participating in the insurance scheme;
the second one from borrowers ﬁling false claims. We examine each in turn.
4.1 Excluding undesirable borrowers
As we saw in section 3 (equation (1)), borrowers of type Pi <L (δX)
−1 are such the cost
of repaying a loan outweighs the beneﬁt of maintaining access to future loans. If granted a
loan without insurance, they would default after one period. The new possibility of insurance
could allow them to default several periods before being evicted from the program. These
risky borrowers would sign up for the insurance contract in order to beneﬁtf r o mas e c o n d
14loan on which to default, as long as the premium is not too large of a cost:
−ψ
[1]

















will thus sign up for the insurance contract and never
repay, for any ﬁrst-period estimate of mean risk µ[1].27
One way to advert this adverse selection is for the ﬁnancial institution to deny insurance
coverage to any borrower who does not have a reputation above a certain threshold e µ. As
long as the threshold is such that it takes suﬃcient rounds of successful loan repayment to
reach it (say N), the institution can weed out borrowers wanting to strategically default on
the insurance contract:
Pi (X − L)+Piδ
h






i + PiX + δ [PiX]
iii
<P iX.
The longer the waiting period, the fewer the borrowers that will undertake the waiting period
rather than default immediately. Note that since the contracts are one-period contracts,
borrowers have no incentive to sign up to the insurance until they have repaid suﬃcient
number of loans to reach the threshold reputation e µ.
The insurance contract must thus provide some incentive mechanism encouraging bor-
rowers to only claim insurance when they need it, and allow the ﬁnancial institution to deny
claims from borrowers it views as opportunistic. The insurance contract will therefore display
the following two properties:
Proposition 1 When the ﬁnancial institution has no information on borrower types or
project outcomes, to protect itself against adverse selection, the ﬁnancial institution provides
incomplete insurance in the sense that:
I No borrowers with reputations below some cutoﬀ e µ are insured;
I There is no insurance in the ﬁrst round of loans:
e µ>µ [1]
27Futhermore, there exist type distributions such that charging a premium corresponding to the average
risk µ
[1] discourages participation of the safer types, leading to participation of only the high-risk borrowers.
15The proof is in appendix A. The intuition is that to keep all undesirable borrowers from
participating, the ﬁnancial institution must put an entry cost to the insurance contract. This
entry cost can take the form of several preliminary rounds of successful repayment — or a
series of discouragingly high premia — until borrowers establish their reputation as willing
repayers.
Do good types participate? Ignoring fraudulent claims for an instant, if the ﬁnancial
institution had perfect information on borrower types, the insurance contract would be priced
such that the premium is exactly the expected cost of insurance, namely
µ
[t]
i =( 1− Pi)L.
Borrowers’ discounted expected return in the insurance contract would thus be given by:
∞ X
t=1
δt−1 (−(1 − Pi)L + Pi (X − L)) =
PiX − L
1 − δ
which, compared to the expected returns without insurance:
Pi (X − L)
1 − δPi
(5)
















and Pi < 1 (6)
However, the institution does not have perfect information on types. Nonetheless, as long
as the ﬁnancial institution’s assessment of a borrower risk is not too high compared to her
actual risk, the borrower will participate.
To see this, examine the returns under the insurance contract if the ﬁnancial institution
estimated correctly a borrower’s probability of failure, and compare them to the returns with-
out insurance. Suppose that from T (i) onwards, the ﬁnancial institution correctly estimates
borrower i’s riskiness. Take the period before the one in which the ﬁnancial institution has
perfect information, T (i)−1. A borrower i satisfying (6) will sign up for an insurance contract
in T (i) − 1 and pay the premium ψ
[T(i)−1]
i if the expected return of doing so is greater than
the expected return of waiting for one more period before getting insurance (and running the
risk of losing access to future loans):
−ψ
[T(i)−1]












16T h i sh o l d sa sl o n ga st h ep r e m i u md o e sn o to u t w e i g ht h eb e n e ﬁt of insurance:
ψ
[T(i)−1]




Working backwards, we show in appendix B that borrower i will sign up for insurance in
period n as long as the premium ψ
[n]
i is less than an upper bound ψ
[n]max






i ≡ (1 − Pi)δ
PiX − L
1 − δ







i | F in n
´
(7)
We further show that this maximum premium ψ
[n]max
i is increasing with n : the better the
information the ﬁnancial institution has on borrower i’s type, the larger the (temporary) de-
viation from the accurate premium the borrower is willing to accept. And since the premium
that borrowers face before signing up for the ﬁrst time is decreasing over time and tends to
zero— by virtue of borrowers having had to be successful for all periods before signing up for
insurance or they are considered in default and lose access to loans—, there exists for, each
Pi > L
δX, a number of waiting periods n(Pi) such that a borrower i will sign up for insurance

















Since the premium tends to zero as the number of waiting periods becomes large, and that




, all “good types” —
the borrowers with projects which are socially beneﬁcial — will eventually participate in the
insurance scheme.
We now turn to the second source of abuse: fraudulent claims.
4.2 Deterring fraudulent claims
Since the ﬁnancial institution has very little information on borrowers in the ﬁrst rounds
of the loans, the gains and losses in reputation for borrowers are greatest in those rounds.
Each repayment or insurance claim represents a large proportion of the information that
the institution has at its disposal to assess individuals. However, as the number of loan
rounds gets large, this diﬀerence in reputation from an extra observation shrinks to the point
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Figure 3: Evolution of Borrower reputation µ
[t]
i
false insurance claims thus diminishes over time. The insurance contract thus has to rely on
additional sanctions to deter false insurance claims.
Proposition 2 The institution must impose costs beyond simple loss of reputation after
insurance claims in order to deter fraudulent claims.
The formal argument is given in Appendix C. The intuition is easy to follow on Figure
3, which represents borrowers reputation as a function on the numbers of loans repaid. The
top curve is a borrower’s reputation with no defaults; the second is a borrowers’ reputation
after one default; and so on. Any default drops the borrower down one curve.
By ﬁling a false claim, the borrower gains the fact of not repaying the current loan and the
insurance premium. The costs are an increase in the future premia due to a loss of reputation,
and an increase in the probability of falling below the reputation cutoﬀ after repeated failures.
However, after enough loan repetitions, these two losses eﬀects become inﬁnitesimal. An
extra cost of claiming insurance must thus be imposed to discourage borrowers from ﬁling
false claims.
18One possible form this extra cost could take is one inspired by US-style credit-card con-
tracts. Banks issue credit cards to customers who have stable incomes28 and a credit record
without great blemishes. If a customer were to miss payments early in the relationship, the
issuing bank would severely restrict (and even stop) that customer’s use of that card. How-
ever, over time, responsible use and timely payments is met with increases in credit limits
and a willingness from the issuing bank to accept late payments. Credit-card holders are
therefore able to use their credit record (i.e. reputation as good payers) to smooth temporary
shortfalls in income. The costs to the holder are a late-payment fee and, if the late payments
are recurrent, negative entries in the holder’s record at various credit rating agencies.29 These
negative entries in the credit record have a suﬃcient impact that after relatively few missed
payments, the ﬁnancial institution will deny the card holder any further services and the card
holder will ﬁnd it diﬃcult to get access to any other ﬁnancial services due to the ensuing
bad credit record. It takes a long time for a person with a bad credit record to “rebuild her
credit.”
While the parallel to US credit-card contracts is not quite exact — credit cards allow late
payments, not defaults30 — the reputation and sanctioning mechanisms proposed in this paper
are quite similar to the ones apparently applied in these contracts. Formally, the sanctioning
to prevent moral hazard behavior is equivalent in our model to downgrading a borrower’s
reputation and reducing her acquired “experience” (by which we mean the number of loans
she participated in). Reducing a borrower’s reputation by more than dictated by the Bayesian
updating rule (3) pushes the defaulting borrower closer to the cutoﬀ below which she’ll be
denied insurance; stripping away experience and considering her as a newer borrower than
she actually is (i.e. using a lower t to calculate updates on her reputation) increases the
risk that she will actually reach the cutoﬀ due to repeated failures. Financial institutions
can customize these losses in reputation and in experience in order to achieve exactly the
punishment they intend. The argument in Appendix D proves the following proposition.
28or to college students with co-signers with stable incomes. Thanks mom!
29The idea of sharp important negative eﬀects from reputation upon claims and slow rebuilding of reputation
during periods of no claims is also prevalent in auto-insurance contracts. Accidents, speeding tickets, and other
signs of hazardous driving are punished by large immediate losses of points that drivers typically need several
years of faultless records to erase.
30In essence, credit-card companies provide temporary loans to borrowers in good standing to make up
income shortfalls.
19Proposition 3 There exits a cutoﬀ, a sequence of insurance premia, and a sequence of costs
in case of insurance claims such that the insurance contract is a Nash Equilibrium.
The proof veriﬁes that the contract modalities are suﬃcient to cover the ﬁnancial institu-
tion’s costs, do not exceed the beneﬁts of insurance for participating borrowers, and induce
truthful reporting from the part of the participating borrowers.
5C o n c l u s i o n
As documented in section 2, insurance is an important by-product of group-lending contracts.
However, by the virtue of transferring risk to groups of borrowers less able to absorb it than
the lending institution, these contracts entail an important loss in eﬃciency.
In this paper, we show that there exists simple credit-with-insurance contracts that ﬁ-
nancial institutions could implement in environments in which insurance mechanisms are
incomplete. No new information is required; the contract is simple to implement; it is cer-
tainly welfare improving since building reputation is less costly than building savings. And
furthermore, it maintains some borrowers who would have dropped out after a failure in the
system.
The question is then understanding why institutions do not implement such contracts.
In one sense, institutions have started to. Brown and Churchill [00] document insurance
contracts in a number of institutions worldwide which are experimenting with life, health, and
property insurance. Furthermore, implicit insurance arrangements exist, whereby institutions
are more ﬂexible on the terms of repayment with older groups.
Nevertheless, explicit repayment insurance has three important hurdles to clear. For
microcredit programs, providing repayment insurance can impact institutional credibility.
These programs are often located in areas in which public targeted credit programs have
failed in the past due to their lax enforcement of rules. If the current institutions are seen as
“soft” on the rules due to the provision of insurance, they may be faced with waves of default,
like their predecessors. Furthermore, many of these institutions, in order to increase their
credibility and their access to funds, are preparing for an eventual transition to becoming
formal banks. Repayment insurance could be viewed by regulators as a “creative accounting”
way to make their portfolio look in good standing, and thus derail the process of formalization.
Third, institutions must be able to cover potential large-scale shocks. Since microﬁnance
20institutions operate in relatively small geographical areas, they are not immune to a large
fraction of their loan portfolio suﬀering bad outcomes (ﬂoods, ﬁre in a market, earthquakes...).
While large covaried shocks are easily observable, the ability of the institution to provide
insurance is then in question. Institutions must then be able to reinsure these risks.
This suggests a very important direction for policy regarding accounting practices. For
institutions to successfully manage loans and insurance, strict accounting rules are needed
to separate true instances of insurance from non-performing loans. As we have seen in
recent banking sector crises, even developed countries are far from adhering to the standards
advocated by the Basel Accords. Transparency, however, is crucial for institutions to gain
credibility: in the eyes of their clients, of their national regulatory agency, as well as with
potential reinsurers.
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23Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
The ﬁnancial institution wants to keep all Pi <
L
δX
from participating. At time 1, however,
the ﬁnancial institution cannot discriminate between borrowers; every borrower has the same
reputation:
µ[1] = E (Pi) ∀i
where the expectation is taken at the beginning of period 1. This, as we saw in the main
t e x tw i t he q u a t i o n( ??), implies that all borrowers in
·¡






sign up for the
insurance contract even though they never intend to repay any loan. The issue is thus to put




When insurance is oﬀered at time t =1 , the problem is that the net expected return from
















When insurance is only oﬀered ﬁrst at time t =2 , the set of people for whom the net
expected return of waiting for insurance in time t =2and then defaulting is greater than the
expected beneﬁt from strategic default in the ﬁr s tl o a ni sa sf o l l o w s :






























Note that whether the range of potential adverse selection into the insurance contract


















24If there is a big decrease in reputation from repaying in period 1, it might be worth for some
Pi to do so, in order to qualify for insurance in period 2 (even though it would not have been
worth signing up for insurance and strategically defaulting in period 1).
Similarly, if insurance is ﬁrst oﬀered at time t = T, the set of borrowers who beneﬁt












L + PiX + δPiX
´
>P iX. (8)

















If there exists a pair
¡
t,µ[t]¢
such that (9) holds for any Pi, then those borrowers will mimic
being a “good borrower” for t − 1 periods and repay all their loans (if they can), in order to
qualify for insurance in period t and immediately strategically default.
The thresholds are depicted in Figure 4 for borrowers with Pi = A L
δX for values of A.
Take any combination (µ,t). If µ>µ ∗ (t) for a particular borrower i, then she will mimic
being a good borrower (for at most t periods. It might hold for some earlier combination of
(µ,t)).
How many risky borrowers would mimic being good borrowers depends on the insurance
premium charged, which itself depends on the ﬁnancial institution’s prior. In ﬁgure 4, we
illustrate the evolution of reputation of borrowers who successfully repay all their loans (a
precondition to qualify for insurance) for 3 diﬀerent priors: a uniform distribution, a bell-
shaped distribution31 as an approximate to a normal distribution, and a distribution with
a higher mass of risky types32 to reﬂect a “pessimistic” prior. In this illustration, if the
ﬁnancial institution imposes 3 periods of successful repayment before borrowers can qualify







would mimic good types in
order to qualify for insurance and then strategically default.






31Ab e t a (6,6) distribution.
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and thresholds (µ∗) for various values of Pi = A L
δX
Borrower with Pi close enough to L
δX would require very long waiting periods to discourage
them from mimicking good borrowers.
Nonetheless, for the ﬁnancial institution, if a borrower repays T−1 loans before defaulting
on two loans in a row, the expected cost of adverse selection for a borrower with probability





t−1 (1 − Pi)L
´
+( δPi)
T−1 (−(1 − µ)L + L + δL)
i.e. up to period T, the borrower repays as long as she can; and at period T (reached with
probability PT−1




then defaults on the two subsequent payments. This has to be compared to the cost L if a





t−1 (1 − Pi)L
´
+( δPi)
T−1 (−(1 − µ)L + L + δL) ≤ L (10)
If the waiting period is long enough, the costs engendered by the borrowers defaulting
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For a given value of δ, the right-hand side of (11) reaches its maximum value at Pi = L
δX,























Note that, for reasonable values of the discount factor δ, the number of waiting periods
suﬃcient for equation (10) to hold is reasonably low, as demonstrated in the Table below.
Values of T
(X=2L)
µ[T] δ .7 .8 .90 .95 .99
0.25 0 1 235
0.50 1 2 346
0.75 1 2 347
1.00 2 3 457
(X=1.2L)
µ[T] δ .7 .8 .90 .95 .99
0.25 01 2 3 5
0.50 12 3 4 6
0.75 12 3 4 7
1.00 23 4 5 7
In summary, we have shown that the institution can never completely eliminate adverse
selection through waiting periods, as some risky borrowers will mimic the behavior of safe
borrowers to qualify for insurance in order to strategically default twice. However, the ﬁnan-
cial institution can control how much adverse selection it is willing to endure through the
choice of the waiting period. Furthermore, even if there is some adverse selection into the
insurance contract, the cost of this adverse selection is smaller than the cost of the origi-
nal adverse selection in the loan contracts without insurance. Furthermore, repayment rates
are improved since borrowers repay a certain amount of loans before defaulting (instead of
defaulting on 100% of their loans).
B Properties of the Insurance Premium
B . 1 U p p e rb o u n do nP r e m i u m
In this section, we derive the upper bound on the premium that borrower i is willing to repay
at the beginning of period T (i) − N.
27Take period T (i)−N. The expected return of having an insurance contract from T (i)−N
o n w a r d si sg i v e nb y :
−ψ
[T(i)−N]



















+ Pi (X − L)
´
+ δN PiX − L
1 − δ
























Compare this expected return of signing up for insurance in period T (i) − N to the
expected return if borrower i waits one extra period before signing up for the insurance
contract (which she can do only if her project succeeds):











i | S in T (i) − N
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i | S in T (i) − N
´
denotes the expected value (taken at the beginning
of time T (i) − N) of the premium in T (i) − N + s conditional on the fact that borrower i’s
project’s success in period T (i) − N.34
To decide whether to sign up for insurance at the beginning of period T − N, borrower i
compares the expected returns (12) and (13). Signing up for insurance in period T (i) − N

























Note that this is equivalent to:
ψ
[T(i)−N]
i ≤ (1 − Pi)δ
PiX − L
1 − δ







i | F in T (i) − N
´
33Using Pi (X − L)=PiX − L +( 1− Pi)L.


















i | F in T (i) − N
´
.
Deﬁne the upper bound to the premium that i is will to pay for a new insurance contract
in period n as:
ψ
[n]max
i ≡ (1 − Pi)δ
PiX − L
1 − δ







i | F in n
´
where E[n] denotes the expectation taken at the beginning of period n. This is exactly equation
(B.2) in the text.
B.2 Proof that maximum premium ψ
[n]max
i is increasing in n
We want to show that the maximum premium borrower i is willing to pay in period n,n a m e l y
(equation (7) in the text)
ψ
[n]max
i ≡ (1 − Pi)δ
PiX − L
1 − δ







i | F in n
´
is increasing in n.
For a borrower with a given history up to time n, compare this maximum premium in
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The ﬁrst term is negative. To compare the terms inside the summation, we note that borrower
i’s project has to be successful in n to receive a loan in period n+1since she has no insurance
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i | S in n;F in n +1 ;F in n +2
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i | F in n;S in n +1
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i | F in n;F in n +1
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.
By the fact that premia go up with failures (claims) and down with successful repayments,
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∀s








i is increasing in n.
C Proof of Proposition 2
C.1 Bayesian updating of reputations
When a borrower undertakes her ﬁrst loan, the ﬁnancial institution has no information on
her type. The new borrower’s reputation is therefore set at the mean of the institution’s prior
on the distribution of borrower types:
µ
[1]




where g(p) denotes the institution’s prior. However, as the ﬁnancial institution gathers
information on the borrower’s repayment behavior, it can update its assessment on her type.
For example, before the second loan, a borrower’s reputation is updated by Bayes’ rule





0 p1−c (1 − p)
c g (p)pdp
R 1
0 p1−c (1 − p)
c g(p)dp
35i.e., it is not the order of success and failures that matter but the total number of each.
30where c =0if i repaid her loan and c =1if i claimed insurance in period 1.
Since the projects are assumed to be independently and identically distributed for each
borrower over time, borrower i’ sr e p u t a t i o ni nt i m et depends simply on the number of loans
(t − 1) and the number of insurance claims c
[t]




































The prior distribution g (p) determines how much weight the institution puts on the new
information for each type.
C.2 Eliminating false claims from safe borrowers
In order to gain intuition on the results, we restrict our attention to beta distributions as
priors, since they are very ﬂexible distributions that can take various shapes and that they




pa−1 (1 − p)
b−1




(t − 1) − c
[t]
i + a
(t − 1) + (a + b)
Note that the uniform distribution is simply a beta with a = b =1 , so that the initial
reputation at t =1would simply be µ
[1]
i =1 /2.
The marginal contribution of an extra insurance claim to borrower i’s reputation is given
by
µ(t,c +1 )− µ(t,c)=
R 1
0 (1 − p)g[t−1] (p)pdp
R 1






where g[t−1] (p) is the distribution of borrower reputations at the beginning of time t − 1,
given c claims up to the beginning of period t−1. Taking the prior distribution to be a beta,
this diﬀerence works out to:
µ(t,c +1 )− µ(t,c)=
(t − 1) − (c +1 )+a
(t − 1) + (a + b)
−
(t − 1) − c + a
(t − 1) + (a + b)
= −
1
(t − 1) + (a + b)
31which is negative and of magnitude decreasing in t.36
False claims lead to a loss in income due to loss in reputation
This loss in reputation translates to a loss of income (through higher premium) in every
period equivalent to:
(1 − µ(t,c +1 ) )δL − (1 − µ(t,c))δL = δ
L
(t − 1) + a + b
or a loss of expected income from t onwards (ignoring the increase in the probability of falling





(t + k − 1) + a + b
!
. (15)
As t becomes large, this cost goes to zero for any beta prior.37
False claims lead to a loss in income due to a higher probability of losing access
to insurance
In addition to the loss on income due to loss in reputation, there is a loss associated with
an increased probability of falling below the cutoﬀ due to repeated failures. Take a borrower
with c claims up to time t :
µ(t,c)=
(t − 1) − c + a
(t − 1) + a + b
To reach the limit below which insurance claims are denied — denote it µ∗ — it takes a certain
amount of further claims. For example, denote by sc
t (0) the number of claims in a row to
go from a reputation of µ(t,c) to a reputation just below µ∗,w h e r esc
t (0) is the ﬁrst integer
such that:
(t − 1) − c + a
(t − 1) + sc
t (0) + a + b
<µ ∗,
Similarly, it takes sc
t (1) loans with sc
t (1)−1 claims (and 1 repayment) to go from a reputation
of µ(t,c) to a reputation just below µ∗, where sc
t (1) is the ﬁrst integer such that:
(t − 1) + 1 − c + a
(t − 1) + sc
t (1) + a + b
<µ ∗.
36This is where the use of a beta distribution is convenient: the loss in reputation in each period is indepen-
dent of the number of claims made up to that point.
37By virtue of Bayesian updating, it is actually true for any prior. We restrict our attention to beta priors
because of what follows.
32More generally, it takes sc
t (z) loans with sc
t (z) − z claims (and z r e p a y m e n t s )t og of r o m
µ(t,c) to just below µ∗,w h e r esc
t (z) is the ﬁrst integer such that:
(t − 1) + z − c + a
(t − 1) + sc
t (z)+a + b
<µ ∗ (16)

















t (z) is increasing in t and limt−→∞ sc
t (z)=∞ since µ∗ < 1.
If a borrower makes no false claims, the probability for a borrower with reputation µ(t,c)
of hitting the limit µ∗ is thus given by summing the number of ways a borrower can have
sc
t (z) − z failures times the probability of having sc








pz (1 − p)
sc
t(z)−z (17)
Note that, from (16), a borrower with an additional insurance claim at time t (i.e. c +1
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t (z − 1)
z
¶
pz (1 − p)
sc
t(z−1)−z (18)
We note that the diﬀerence between (18) and (17) is decreasing in t and converges to zero
as t −→ ∞. This is due to the fact that the diﬀerence can be written as

















pz (1 − p)
sc
t(z−1)−z (19)
where ξ denotes the diﬀerence sc
t (z) − sc






























t (z − 1).





, which itself is smaller than sc
t (z)
z , and
that p ≤ 1); that the left-hand side of (20) goes to zero as t goes to inﬁnity by the fact that
lim
n−→∞ nzpz (1 − p)
n−z =0 for all z ≥ 0
(because p ≤ 1); and that the limit of nzpz (1 − p)
n−z as z approaches n is zero (the sum in
(19) hence does not diverge).
The loss associated with the increased probability of falling below the cutoﬀ due to an
additional false insurance claim thus goes to zero as the number of loans increases.
Net gains from false claims are positive for t large enough
The gains from deviating, however, remain signiﬁcant and comprise of not repaying the
current loan L. As we saw above, the costs of false claims are twofold: (1) false claims decrease
future income due to a loss of reputation; and (2) false claims increase the probability of falling
below the cutoﬀ (19) in the future. Since both costs tend to zero as the number of periods
increase, and since the cost of deviation remains constant, we have that all borrowers will thus
eventually beneﬁtf o rﬁling false claims. It is therefore necessary for the insurance contract
to impose costs beyond simple loss of reputation after insurance claims in order to deter false
claims, as stated in Proposition 2.
D Proof of Proposition 3
To prove the proposition, we have to show (1) that there exists a cutoﬀ to deter adverse
selection; (2) that there exists a punishment suﬃcient to deter false claims (moral hazard);
(3) that the insurance premium is suﬃcient to cover the ﬁnancial institution’s insurance costs;
and (4) that the contract satisﬁes the borrowers’ participation constraint.
Cutoﬀ to deter adverse selection
In the proof of Proposition 1, we showed that the ﬁnancial institution can choose a number
of waiting periods to make the adverse selection problem as small as it wants.
Suﬃcient punishment to deter false claims (moral hazard)
In the proof of Proposition 2, we showed that extra sanctions beyond simple loss of
reputation were necessary to deter false insurance claims.
34The gross beneﬁts from ﬁling a false insurance claim are equal to the cost of not repaying
the loan L. To discourage moral hazard behavior, the sanction for a claim simply has to be
equal to the beneﬁto ft h em o r a lh a z a r d .
The simple punishment we propose in this paper is the following. When a borrower ﬁles



















L ≥ L. (21)
The left-hand side of (21) is the premium costs above the current premium cost that borrower
i paid in the N
[t]
i previous periods. The ﬁnancial institution chooses N
[t]
i such that this extra
cost is exactly equal to the beneﬁt of deviation for borrower i in period t in order to avert
any false claims.
Does this contract maintain the participation constraint in case of real claims? If borrower
i already had an insurance contract in t−N
[t]
i , her participation constraint is clearly satisﬁed,
since it is just a repetition of what she did in the past, which took into account this risk of
failure. If t − N
[t]
i is greater that a borrower’s insurance experience (i.e. borrower i did not
have an insurance contract in t − N
[t]
i ), then the ﬁnancial institution considers the borrower
in default.
Participation constraint for ﬁnancial institution
As shown in the proof of how to limit adverse selection above (appendix D), the insurance
scheme increase repayment rates for borrowers who strategically default. This softens the
institutions’ participation constraint.
Furthermore, borrowers only participate once the premium charged is “not too high” com-
pared to the actual cost of insuring the borrowers. On average, the institution thus charges
borrowers higher premia than the actual cost of insuring them (although the institution
cannot change this because of adverse selection issues).
If the institution oﬀered credit without insurance, oﬀering credit with insurance satisﬁes
its participation constraint.
Participation constraint for borrowers
35Participation in the insurance contract of the “good guys,” i.e. borrowers with Pi > L
δX,
follows from the argument given in Section 4.1 (p. 16). They are willing to repay their
loans even without insurance. This means that the waiting periods do not deter them from
participation. They start participating once the premium has gone down suﬃciently.
36Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics
Number
Variables Mean Std. Dev.* Median* Min* 5%* 95%* Max* observ.
Personal/Business characteristics
Average weekly sales in good weeks ($US) 531 770 381 14 112 1203 13333 782
Bad week sales, as a fraction of good week 0.58 0.17 0.58 0.03 0.29 0.84 1.00 782
Buying merchandise daily 0.19 --- --- --- --- --- --- 782
Buying 2-3 times per week 0.29 --- --- --- --- --- --- 782
Buying once a week 0.35 --- --- --- --- --- --- 782
Only one business 0.79 --- --- --- --- --- --- 772
Sole income provider to household 0.40 --- --- --- --- --- --- 782
Access to bank loans 0.04 --- --- --- --- --- --- 782
Access to loans from money-lender 0.47 --- --- --- --- --- --- 782
Money-lender interest rate (over loan) 15.84 7.61 15 3 5 25 40 330
Access to loans from family/friends 0.32 --- --- --- --- --- --- 782
Loan characteristics
Loan size (in US$) 740 555 650 56 167 1700 5000 782
Loan size/average daily purchases 17 20 12 1 2 47 93 647
Payment size (in US$) 124 97 93 5 29 276 718 782
Payment/average daily purchase 2.98 3.40 1.92 0.02 0.29 8.73 27.69 647
% keeping loans to make first payments 0.19 --- --- --- --- --- --- 780
Number of payments kept 1.88 1.17 1.75 0.10 1.00 5.00 5.00 146
Group characteristics
Group size 3.7 0.94 33368 2 1 0
groups of 3 0.50 † 105
groups of 4 0.34 † 72
groups of 5 0.12 † 26
groups of 6 0.01 † 3
groups of 7 0.00 † 1
groups of 8 0.01 † 3
* Standard deviation, minimum, maximum, median, and 5% and 95% points are not reported for dummy variables.
† As a percentage of total number of groups.Table 2.  Insurance Occurances in Credit Groups
Insurance need in past year. (Someone in group has had trouble making own payment in past year)
%
none 79 0.38
1-4 times 85 0.40
more than 4 times 46 0.22
210
Reason insurance was needed. N%
low sales 155 0.63
bad planning 30 0.12
robbery 7 0.03
family illness 49 0.20
other 7 0.03
248
Who provides insurance? N%
a member of the group 128 0.52
the whole group 42 0.17
someone from outside 49 0.20
self insurance 8 0.03 (savings, money-lender)









* As we have only current payment information, and not the payment information at the time insurance 
   was given, these are only approximations.






0.67Table 3.  Risk heterogeneity in groups
12345 N  
1 2 18 21 26 33 100
2 5 11 13 17 46
3 2 14 22 38
4 1 17 18
5 8 8
210 groups
(The small italics indicate cells with less than 5 observations)
Table 4.  Net insurance provision in groups
12345
2.00 0.91 0.67 1.33 0.47
(0.00) (0.46) (0.33) (0.46) (0.25)
0.75 1.00 1.00 0.00







(The small italics indicate cells with less than 5 observations)
(Bold indicates significance at 10% level)
(Standard errors of mean in parenthesis)
(mean # times provided - # times received)


































Highest risk quintile in group
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Number of groups